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A B S T R A C T
This paper provides an example of how communities can adapt to extreme forms of environmental change and
uncertainty over the longer term. We analyse the interactions between scientists, communities and risk managers
and examine the interpretation and communication of uncertain scientiﬁc information during a long-lived
volcanic eruption in Tungurahua, Ecuador. This is complemented with a detailed study of the eruptions of 2006
and 2014, which exempliﬁes the complexity of interactions during periods of heightened volcanic activity. Our
study describes how a ‘shadow network’ has developed outside of, but in interaction with, the formal risk
management institutions in Ecuador, improving decision-making in response to heightened volcanic activity.
The ﬁndings suggest that the interactions have facilitated important adaptations in the scientiﬁc advisory
response during eruptions (near-real-time interpretation of the volcanic hazards), in hazard communication, and
in the evacuation processes. Improved communication between stakeholders and the establishment of thresholds
for evacuations have created an eﬀective voluntary evacuation system unique to Tungurahua, allowing people to
continue to maintain their livelihoods during heightened volcanic activity and associated periods of uncertainty.
Understanding how shadow networks act to minimise the negative consequences of volcanic activity provides
valuable insights for increasing societal resilience to other types of hazards.
1. Introduction
Volcanic hazards such as pyroclastic density currents (PDC; rapid, hot
avalanches of volcanic rocks, ash and gases), lava ﬂows and lahars (volcanic
mudﬂows) can cause total devastation in their immediate path, so mana-
ging volcanic risk often requires the temporary displacement of commu-
nities around volcanoes. As for many other natural hazards, forecasting
volcanic hazards is inherently uncertain, but volcanomonitoring institutions
also provide valuable advice on preparing for, and mitigating, volcanic risk
(Lockwood and Hazlett, 2010). Monitoring has improved and deaths from
volcanic eruptions have declined in the last century (Auker et al., 2013),
alongside the development of more comprehensive disaster risk manage-
ment (DRM) systems. Yet data from UNOCHA demonstrates that at least 2
million people were displaced as a consequence of volcanic activity in the
last 30 years, even with comparatively few recent large-scale events, in
comparison to the long-term eruptive record (Pyle, 2015). As with many
other environmental hazards, there are signiﬁcant negative social and
economic impacts of displacement as a result of volcanic activity (Lane
et al., 2003; Tobin and Whiteford, 2002; Hicks and Few, 2015; Armijos and
Few, 2015; Few et al., 2017); and studies highlight the need for DRM sys-
tems to minimise the immediate impacts and at the same time protect
people’s lives and livelihoods over the long term (Wilson et al., 2012).
Volcanic activity can continue, often intermittently, for weeks,
months or even years and so displacements can last for long periods or
even result in abandonment of settlements altogether (Plymouth in
Montserrat). The enforcement of evacuations varies from setting to
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setting, but most often involves the declaration of high risk or ‘for-
bidden’ zones (Mei et al., 2013). In recent years several deaths have
occurred within such zones as populations have struggled to adhere to
the rules when faced with the stronger imperative of sustaining their
livelihoods (including Merapi and Sinabung in Indonesia, and Mon-
tserrat in the Caribbean) (Mei et al., 2013; Usamah and Haynes, 2012;
Loughlin et al., 2002). A growing body of literature highlights the need
to understand the long term implications of volcanic activity for peo-
ple’s livelihoods and wellbeing (e.g. Kelman and Mather, 2008; Hicks
and Few, 2015; Thorvaldsdóttir and Sigbjörnsson, 2015; Armijos and
Few, 2015) yet little attention has been paid so far to the local DRM
systems and how these can evolve to reduce the negative impacts of
volcanic activity on the lives and livelihoods of people living in close
proximity to volcanoes.
The paper highlights the role of the ‘shadow network’, essentially a
set of informal institutional arrangements and interactions that have
developed alongside formal DRM structures in response to activity of
Tungurahua volcano, Ecuador. The network has facilitated improve-
ments in monitoring, communication and evacuations, allowing people
to maintain their livelihoods during heightened volcanic activity.
Shadow networks are deﬁned as being the subset of informal institu-
tions that interact with formal governance systems. The paper examines
the interactions between scientists, communities and risk managers in
the interpretation and communication of uncertain scientiﬁc informa-
tion and in evacuation processes, as examples of how communities at
risk can adapt and respond to apparently extreme forms of environ-
mental change.
The paper ﬁrst introduces the case study, the theoretical framework
and methods used to conduct the data analysis. It then presents a de-
tailed analysis of empirical data relating to hazard monitoring, com-
munications and evacuation processes for two speciﬁc time periods of
escalations in volcanic activity, 2006 and 2014, and discusses the main
insights emerging from the case study. Understanding how shadow
networks work to minimise the negative consequences of volcanic ac-
tivity potentially provides valuable insights for increasing societal re-
silience to other types of hazards.
2. Repeated shocks: changes in volcanic behaviour since 1999 and
the need to adapt
Tungurahua volcano is located on the Eastern Cordillera of the
Ecuadorian Andes (long: 78.45W, lat: 1.47S, alt: 5023 masl.) and covers
part of the territory of two provinces, Tungurahua and Chimborazo.
The volcano is surrounded by several towns at varying elevations (see
Fig. 1) and it is estimated that more than 30,000 people live in both
rural and urban areas where the volcano poses a threat to life. Areas
outside the main inﬂuence zone of the volcano, that also experience
sporadic ash falls, have a population of more than 200,000 (INEC,
2010; Mothes et al., 2015).
Since 1534 (or the beginning of Spanish colonial times when written
records are available), there have been four major historical eruptive
episodes of Tungurahua, one every century. These lasted between two
and ﬁve years, with the exception of current activity, which started in
1999 (Hall et al., 1999). Historical volcanic activity is characterised by
relatively small explosive eruptions (Volcanic Explosivity Index 2 and
3) with volcanic hazards including lava ﬂows, volcanic ash fall, and
PDC’s. Geophysical activity is monitored at Tungurahua by the Geo-
physical Institute of the National Polytechnic School (IG-EPN), an au-
tonomous agency, funded by the state, responsible for seismic and
volcanic monitoring and scientiﬁc advice to the national government.
In September 1999 IG-EPN established the Observatorio del Volcán
Tungurahua (OVT), sited 13 km from the volcano with a direct view of
the volcano’s NW ﬂank (Fig. 1).
From April 1999, the volcano showed increasing activity, with a
sequence of seismic events consistent with the transport of magma to
the surface. This began with volcano-tectonic (VT) and long-period (LP)
earthquakes, followed by increasing sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions,
and volcanic tremor signals (seismicity suggesting shallow magma
storage) (IG-EPN, 1999). Between 5 and 15 October, a series of small
explosions was followed by ground deformation and visible in-
candescence (magma reaching shallow levels and the surface). On Oc-
tober 15, IG-EPN recommended raising the alert level and national
authorities responded by evacuating approximately 26,000 inhabitants
from areas around the volcano (Le Pennec et al., 2012; Tobin and
Whiteford, 2002). On October 16, local residents were given 30 h to
leave voluntarily after which about 50% of the residents were forced to
evacuate by the military (Tobin and Whiteford, 2002). Due to a limited
availability of shelters people had to move in with family and friends
outside the high risk areas, to rent accommodation or live on the streets
in nearby cities. In the midst of much confusion, many sold their
property and animals for much less than market value (Lane et al.,
2003; Tobin and Whiteford, 2002; Armijos and Few, 2015; Few et al.,
2017). Volcanic activity then declined, but the lack of an oﬃcial de-
cision to reoccupy evacuated areas led to confrontations between local
residents, the police and the military. National authorities went on to
lift the restriction and allow residents back (Vieira, 2003), but the large-
scale evacuation, loss of property and livelihoods and social upheaval
has had long-lasting eﬀects on the local population and resulted in
widespread distrust in authorities and scientists (Lane et al., 2003;
Tobin and Whiteford, 2002; Armijos and Few, 2015; Few et al., 2017;
Mothes et al., 2015).
From 2000 to 2006 volcanic activity at Tungurahua was char-
acterised by intermittent periods of intense seismic activity followed by
small Strombolian eruptions (discrete explosions) and ash falls, with
subsequent rainfall-triggered remobilisation of ash as lahars, inter-
spersed with periods of quiescence (Arellano et al., 2008). During these
years, intense ash falls and lahars impacted farmers on the slopes of the
volcano, destroying crops, killing animals and damaging access roads
and other infrastructure (Le Pennec et al., 2012; Sword-Daniels et al.,
2011). The biggest challenge for DRM came in May 2006, when in-
creasing seismic activity at the volcano culminated in a sustained ex-
plosive eruption on 14 July, which lasted over four hours. It generated
the ﬁrst PDC since the start of volcanic unrest in 1999. On 16 August
2006, a series of Vulcanian explosions (explosive eruptions that can be
sustained for seconds to a few minutes), was followed by a stronger
sustained explosive eruption, that lasted over 16 h. This eruption pro-
duced several PDC, killing 6 people and destroying more than 50 homes
on the ﬂanks of the volcano (Mothes et al., 2015; Valencia, 2010). The
impact caused by the 2006 eruptions prompted the state and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to build resettlement homes for
those living in high risk areas (Reliefweb, 2006). Despite this, hundreds
of families continued to live and/or work on the ﬂanks of the volcano to
sustain their livelihoods.
After the August 2006 eruption, the volcano showed intermittent
activity, predominantly producing ash fall that impacted agriculture
and aviation routes, and PDC which did not extend beyond the unin-
habited upper ﬂanks of the volcano. A new phase of energetic and more
frequent Vulcanian eruptions occurred between August 2012 and
August 2014. Several of these eruptions produced PDC, for instance, in
July and October 2013 (Hall et al., 2015) and February 2014, but in
general these were less extensive than those in July and August 2006.
Between 2010 and the date of writing, the eruptive episodes have be-
come shorter in duration but marked by more intense explosive activity
(Hall et al., 2015; whole sequence illustrated in Fig. 5 of, Mothes et al.,
2015).
The physical nature of the hazard has changed since 1999, as have
the livelihoods and the societal conditions of the population. Settlement
patterns, access to services and infrastructure, and livelihood activities
in urban and rural areas on the slopes of the volcano, have all been
impacted by —and had to change in response to—volcanic hazards in
Tungurahua (Few et al., 2017). It is in this changing environment that
formal and informal institutions have interacted through a ‘shadow
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network’ for DRM, which has played an important role in managing
risk.
3. Formal and informal interactions in disaster risk management
Risk management systems undergo changes in line with broader
governance trends and shifts, but are also modiﬁed during and after
disasters and in response to social pressures (Kingdon, 1995), with
feedback processes that are non-linear and unpredictable (Ramalingam
et al., 2008). Some DRM systems will collapse, while others adapt and
re-organize, retaining their basic functions, structure and identity
(Adger et al., 2005; DFID, 2011; Berkes et al., 2003; Pelling, 2011;
Walker et al., 2002).
Similarly, the hazardous processes themselves can also be dynamic.
Volcanic eruptions can persist for weeks, months and even years and
can variably impact the communities that surround them. Volcanoes
can exhibit a range of behaviour, with one eruptive episode potentially
changing the outcome for a later event, along with the likelihood of
cumulative impacts (Cashman and Sparks, 2013). In these dynamic
environments, formal and informal institutions interact to shape col-
lective action decisions to manage risk (Tierney, 2012; Wilkinson,
2013). These formal institutions comprise legislation and parliamentary
procedures for DRM, standard operating procedures and other formal
arrangements guiding actions and interactions between stakeholders;
while informal institutions include relationships of kinship and cus-
tomary practices, incorporating diﬀerent knowledge sources and com-
petencies (Handmer and Dovers, 2007; Newig et al., 2010; Pelling and
Holloway, 2006). In a crisis, where the “time to think, consult and gain
acceptance for decisions is highly restricted”, decision-making pro-
cesses and actions are often ad-hoc and reactive (Boin et al., 2005:11).
On the other hand, well-established informal institutions for risk
management are more likely to promote adaptation and learning from
disaster response (Wenger, 1998). Indeed, high exposure to threats and
repeated events over time can create opportunities for experiences that
enhance overall system resilience (Moser, 2008).
The interaction between formal and informal institutions also in-
ﬂuences how organisations and individuals respond to a particular
threat or event. Where these are separate, contradictions and tensions
may appear; but where formal and informal institutions complement
each other they produce more eﬀective risk management practices
(Wilkinson, 2012, 2015).
Shadow networks, deﬁned as the networks or spaces of interaction
that develop outside of, but interact with, formal institutions, can help
to build these complementarities (Folke et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 2006;
Pelling et al., 2008). They often emerge spontaneously in response to
complex social and environmental problems (Shaw, 1997; Stacey,
1996). Their role in natural resource management and climate change
adaptation has been studied in some depth; actors in shadow networks
are found to be more ﬂexible and adaptive, willing to experiment and
generate alternative solutions, than formal institutions on their own
(Folke et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 2006).
Shadow networks are also characterised by their ability to build
innovative linkages between entities that were otherwise not connected
(Schmidt-Thome and Peltonen, 2006). A number of studies, for ex-
ample, highlight the role of social networks that link the state and local
communities in supporting capacity building for ecosystem manage-
ment (Berkes, 2002; Folke et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 2004). Another
feature of shadow networks is that they are often triggered by a social
or ecological crisis and the recognition of the need for an alternative
governance system (Olsson et al., 2004; Olsson et al., 2006). The
spontaneous civil society response to the Mexico City earthquake, for
example, challenged the legitimacy of a highly centralised authoritarian
government, which had failed to respond adequately to the disaster
(Dynes et al., 1990; Quarantelli, 1993; Quarantelli, 1994). Olsson et al.
(2004) observe that more adaptive co-management of ecosystems
usually starts with responses to crises by individual actors that then
expand to become a network of actors. Overall, however, evidence of
how these shadow networks operate in DRM has received less attention
and is less common than in natural resource management. More work is
needed to unpack the characteristics and roles of their structures vis-à-
vis formal DRM arrangements, particularly their ability to respond to
the uncertainty and change inherent in hazardous processes.
A feature of formal-informal interactions in DRM is the role that
they play in the co-production of knowledge about risk and risk
Fig. 1. Map of Tungurahua volcano showing
towns, villages resettlement sites and the
OVT (Tungurahua volcano Observatory).
Map adapted from Few et al. (2017).
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communication. This is particularly pertinent in the case of volcanoes,
as the location of volcano observatories near active volcanoes often
bring scientists into close contact with communities (Barclay et al.,
2008). Tension between public perception and expert judgement is
common in hazard assessment and communication (Jasanoﬀ, 2004;
Fischhoﬀ, 1995) and this has generated further interest in the co-pro-
duction of scientiﬁc knowledge and practice (Donovan and
Oppenheimer, 2014). Similarly, research on DRM emphasises the
wealth of knowledge held by communities on the hazards and risk that
they face, the need to blend scientiﬁc and indigenous knowledge to
assess risk (Kelman et al., 2009; Mercer et al., 2010) and the importance
of managing risk at a local level (Lavell, 1994; Lavell et al., 2003). Yet
when it comes to formulating actions for local-level DRM, the emphasis
on co-production is largely concerned with the interactions between the
state and society —how local authorities can work in partnership with
communities (UNISDR, 2015)— and less on the role that scientists can
play (Scolobig and Pelling, 2016; Barclay et al., 2008).
In this paper we consider the very speciﬁc roles of shadow networks
in hazard interpretation, monitoring and evacuations processes, re-
sulting from the close interaction between scientists, communities and
government oﬃcials over 15 years in relation to Tungurahua volcano.
These networks have important characteristics linked to their role in
helping people to make evacuation decisions and are distinct from other
social networks that exist in Tungurahua (Jones et al., 2013).
4. Research methods
This paper examines the evolution and interactions of the geophy-
sical monitoring system, the community-based monitoring of the vol-
cano and the oﬃcial risk management institutions in Tungurahua since
1999. The analysis is based on a review of secondary literature sup-
plemented by primary data generated through 130 semi-structured in-
terviews conducted in Ecuador between July 2013 and December 2014.
These interviews were conducted with 14 national, 9 provincial and 14
local level government oﬃcials, 3 scientists, 20 community leaders and
70 residents of the ﬂanks of the volcano, as part of the Strengthening
Resilience in Volcanic Areas (STREVA) research project (2012–2018).
Individuals were selected using purposive and snowball sampling
methods and were interviewed by STREVA project researchers.
This is complemented with a focus on two speciﬁc time periods of
escalating volcanic activity: in 2006 and 2014. These time periods re-
present important moments in the volcano’s behaviour and in the sci-
entiﬁc interpretation of it. They are used to study the social responses,
and in particular the role of the shadow system in fostering interactions
between communities, scientists and local authorities. For the 2006 and
2014 ‘crisis’ periods, we systematically analyse monitoring data, sci-
entiﬁc interpretations of the hazards, communications between stake-
holders and evacuation behaviour. This analysis is based on data from
IG-EPN observatory records and special reports (IG-EPN, 2014a, 2014b,
2006b, 2006a, 2006c), semi-structured interviews conducted with the
stakeholders involved in responding to the crises and secondary lit-
erature. We also documented communications between stakeholders to
analyse the use of common terms employed to describe volcanic ac-
tivity in Tungurahua.
5. Adaptations and interactions in the risk management system
This section describes the development of the volcanic risk man-
agement system at Tungurahua volcano, with a particular focus on
decision-making and interactions between local stakeholders in relation
to hazard monitoring, interpretation, communication and evacuations.
The system comprises formal DRM organisations and procedures, in-
cluding the IG-EPN and local emergency operations committees (COE),
as well as the ongoing instrumental and presential volcano monitoring
carried out by IG-EPN staﬀ based at the OVT. It also includes informal
arrangements such as the community-based volunteer group that
observe the volcano, known as the vigía network (Stone et al., 2014).
The shadow network links these groups and practices through a set of
speciﬁc interactions aimed at managing risk. These include informal
channels of communication between scientists and authorities; ad-hoc
support from the military and local government to move people in and
out of high-risk areas during periods of heightened activity; and the
community self-organised evacuations, based on monitoring data and
on people’s own experience and knowledge of the volcano gained over
the years.
5.1. The geophysical monitoring system and interpretations of volcanic
activity
IG-EPN scientists based locally at the OVT have been monitoring the
volcano continuously since 1999 (Mothes et al., 2015). Seismicity, in-
cluding individual earthquake types (namely tremor, VT, LP and re-
gional non-volcanic earthquakes), are recorded to the nearest minute
and used to assess volcanic activity in near-real-time for rapid decision-
making. Since early 2000, the scientists have been using the local radio
to provide weekly updates about the volcano, and giving talks in
communities (Mothes et al., 2015). At this time, a detection system for
lahars was installed on the Northern and Western ﬂanks of the volcano.
The Tungurahua seismic activity index (IAS) is a measure of the total
seismic energy weighted on diﬀerent volcanic earthquake types, which
was calibrated using as reference the seismicity of the period from
October 1999 to December 2005 (Palacios, 2016). It has been calcu-
lated on a daily basis since late 2005 and provides the scientists with
information about the longer-term trends in volcanic activity.
In 2006, ground deformation, gas emission and acoustic signal
(infrasound) measurements started to be recorded continuously, im-
proving signiﬁcantly the capacity to interpret volcanic behaviour.
Following the start of volcanic unrest in 2006, IG-EPN started produ-
cing special reports and following a communication protocol through
which more than 500 local, regional and national authorities are con-
tacted via fax on a daily basis (Mothes et al., 2015). IG-EPN now also
publishes daily reports using data from OVT and shares them with the
wider public via email lists, the IG-EPN web page and other social
media platforms (Twitter and Facebook). During periods of heightened
activity, scientists are in constant communication with the authorities,
the local COE, vigías and radio stations, through diﬀerent communica-
tion media including telephone, radio and social media. IG-EPN scien-
tists interpret data to be able to “provide rapid and frequent brieﬁngs to
authorities concerning increases in pre-eruption signals and to help
them to make critical decisions” (Mothes et al., 2015:6).
Communication of activity level changes is based on years of ex-
perience and the development of thresholds, which have allowed sci-
entists at IG-EPN to understand and describe the volcano’s behaviour
over time. Thresholds in geophysical monitoring data are recognised as
levels associated with previous observations of eruptions, either by
formal calibration (IAS) or informal comparison (volcano seismicity,
deformation and gas emission). Similarly, thresholds for observed vol-
canic activity are noted in OVT records for both levels of activity (ex-
plosion intensity) and the presence of that activity (PDC).
Interpretation of the volcanic activity at Tungurahua has developed
in-line with increasing sophistication of the geophysical monitoring
network and detailed observations of the texture and composition of
erupted rock and gases. The most intense activity in 2006, for example,
was inferred to have arisen from the intrusion of a volatile-rich basaltic
andesite into the storage region during seismic unrest (Samaniego et al.,
2011; Myers et al., 2014). These volatile-rich pulses continue from 2010
to present, but the more violent activity that occurs without warning is
attributed to the interplay between this material and stiﬀ viscous con-
duit plugs developing in the shallow system (Hall et al., 2015). This
violent disruption and failure of the conduit plug has comparatively less
warning, sometimes only an hour or so, going from a very quiet state to
a full Vulcanian style eruption (Palacios, 2016). Surface exhalations
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throughout the activity have been classiﬁed seismically using their
event source characteristics into explosions, jetting (roaring) and
chugging (harmonic tremor) and have been related to diﬀering modes
of degassing within the system (Table 1, Ruiz et al., 2006). Chugging
signals were ﬁrst observed in 2004. Large Vulcanian explosions in 2006
were recognised to have high acoustic amplitudes and were accom-
panied by powerful audio booms (‘cañonazos’); behaviour also true of
later Vulcanian activity (Hall et al., 2015, 2013; Ruiz et al., 2006). The
development of these classiﬁcations shows increasing capacity to in-
terpret the volcano’s sub-surface source activity from monitoring and
surface observations, leading to identiﬁcation of thresholds that can be
used to anticipate changes in volcanic activity.
5.2. Community-based monitoring and communications
In early 2000, after the crisis, residents returned to the high-risk
areas on the slopes of the volcano, prompting civil defence authorities
(in charge of DRM at that time), scientists and the communities to es-
tablish an early warning system that would help protect them. At the
same time, scientists were interested in accessing more visual ob-
servations from diﬀerent points around the volcano, and communities
wanted improved access to oﬃcial and scientiﬁc information. A vigía
network was set up in response to these various needs, which currently
is made up of 35 community-based volunteers who collect and record
physical observations of the volcano and manage sirens at the com-
munity level (Mothes et al., 2015, Stone et al., 2014). During periods of
low volcanic activity, vigías communicate with the OVT daily at 20:00
to report their observations. During periods of heightened volcanic
activity, communications between the OVT and the vigías increase in
relation to the activity of the volcano, occur immediately after ob-
servable changes, and ﬂow both ways. Observers seek information from
the monitoring network that corroborates their visual observations, as
one vigía explains:
“That is the advantage for us, we have access to the scientists 24 h a day.
I feel a lot safer now, because if there is anything unusual, I just ask for
information, and they give it to us” (19 February 2014).
Through formal training and regular communication, vigías and
scientists have developed a shared vocabulary to describe and com-
municate styles and intensities of volcanic activity. This vocabulary (see
Table 1 and depicted in Fig. 2 and 3), is grounded in the physical
phenomena observable by the wider community, but also represents a
shared interpretation of what is happening inside the volcano. For ex-
ample, the association of ‘vibración de ventanas’ (rattling of windows)
with volcanic explosions is prominent in two-way communications
between vigías and IG-EPN. It is worth noting that the absence of par-
ticular phenomena (notably rattling of windows and ground move-
ments) is considered as noteworthy as their presence. The success of the
system has also been made possible by scientists’ eﬀorts to reach out to
the communities during times of volcanic quiescence through formal
interactions in training activities and continuous informal meetings and
visits (Mothes et al., 2015, Stone et al., 2014).
The roles of the vigías have expanded with time. Today, in addition
to their formal role in providing observations of the volcano to scien-
tists at the OVT, they also support IG-EPN in helping to maintain
monitoring stations and equipment located in remote areas around the
volcano (Stone et al., 2014; Armijos and Few, 2015). Vigías can receive
information from the observatory before the authorities are able to take
action and on various occasions they have supported evacuations. This
is not a formal requirement but as one vigía explains:
“When things get bad we use the car to evacuate people. It is diﬃcult for
people to walk […] so when the Geofísico [OVT] tells us ‘you need to be
prepared, there might be some changes’ we let people know […]. People get
ready, they put their animals closer to their homes, far away from the rivers,
and in the afternoon we leave” (20th of February 2014).
A critical characteristic of the vigía network is that it performs
various functions, although the intensity and levels of communication
between scientists, vigías and communities diﬀers from place to place.
5.3. The ‘oﬃcial’ risk management system
DRM in Ecuador has undergone substantial changes since 1999
(Mothes et al., 2015; Stone et al., 2014; Tobin and Whiteford, 2002;
Armijos and Few, 2015). The events of 1999 and the mis-management
of evacuations have had a long lasting impact on the lives and liveli-
hoods of those who returned to their homes and who have continued to
reside in areas considered to be at high risk. Improving early warning
systems and trust between communities, scientists and local authorities
has therefore become a priority.
Between 1999 and 2006, local municipalities and civil defence au-
thorities worked together to conduct training and improve shelter
availability and evacuation routes. Resettlement sites were also built
from 2007 to 2012 to provide alternative homes to residents who lived
in high-risk areas. There are 4 main resettlement areas, Rio Blanco and
La Paz, in Tungurahua Province, and Guano and Penipe, in Chimborazo
Province, where approximately 750 homes have been provided by the
state and NGOs (Armijos and Few, 2015). These houses were originally
built with the aim of achieving permanent resettlement but nowadays
they are used by its residents in a variety of ways. Some families have
moved there permanently, some only spend the nights at the resettle-
ment sites while still returning to their land closer to the volcano during
the day. Others have chosen to occupy both houses and live part of the
week in each one, also using the resettlement home as an evacuation
shelter (Few et al., 2017).
By 2008, the most important changes in formal risk management
Table 1
Observations shared across ‘vigía’ network and interpretations as they appear in the published literature. Superscripts refer to sources of scientiﬁc interpretation: 1– (Ruiz et al., 2006); 2–
(Hall et al., 2013).
Observations Associated Surface
Activity
Interpretation Usage (from OVT reports)
‘Bramidos’ (roaring) Smaller explosions Repeated minor failures in shallow conduit
(Strombolian jetting)1
July 2006 (largely by scientists) August 2006, February
2014
‘Cañonazos’ (cannon ﬁre) Larger explosions ‘Associated with high energy seismic outbursts’
Vulcanian explosion from failure in shallow
conduit2
July 2006 (largely by scientists;
observers = ‘detonaciones’;) August 2006, February 2014
‘Movimiento de suelo’ (ground movement) Felt ground motion Increasing intensity of seismic activity1 July 2006, August 2006
‘Vibración de ventanas’ (window rattling) Explosions Increased intensity of Strombolian jetting 1 July 2006, August 2006
‘Caída de ceniza negra y ﬁna’ (ﬁne black
ash fall)
Ash fall Possibly new magmatic activity February 2014
‘Caída de ceniza con tamaño de grano como
el del azúcar’ (Ashfall with grains like
sugar)
Ash fall Increasing intensity of explosions February 2014
‘Caída de cascajo’ Scoria Fall Larger Explosions August 2006, February 2014
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institutions took place via the creation of a new constitution and
adoption of a decentralised system of governance in Ecuador.
According to Article 390 of the Constitution, disaster risk should be
addressed under the principle of subsidiarity, making municipalities
directly responsible for managing risk within their territories. If this
capacity is surpassed, higher levels of government will provide tech-
nical and ﬁnancial support but should not undermine local responsi-
bility (Constituyente, 2008). In addition, the formal DRM activities of
Civil Defence were reassigned to a new Secretary of Risk Management
(SNGR), responsible for coordinating all activities related to prevention,
response and mitigation of disasters at all levels of government. Local
governments are now required to manage emergency funds and allocate
resources from their budgets for risk management and coordinate
emergency response through the COE, including recommending a
change in the alert level to the SNGR (SNGR, 2014).
Since the introduction of these new arrangements in 2008, DRM in
relation to Tungurahua volcano has evolved substantially. Local pro-
cedures for volcanic emergencies, unique to the Tungurahua context,
have been developed, including a local alert scheme designated by
colours for levels yellow, orange and red. For example, when volcanic
activity is such that an Orange Alert level is issued, oﬃcially, evacua-
tion plans should be activated. In practice, people continue with their
activities and carry out a partial form of evacuation unique to
Tungurahua. This consists of those residents with land on the slopes of
the volcano, spending the day working then returning to resettlement
sites to sleep at night; a practice made possible by the military pro-
viding transport as well as local bus companies transporting people in
and out of the communities. Additionally, at this alert level, and when
ash fall is intense, the state provides feed for animals through a local
distribution programme (Few et al., 2017). This support allows people
not only to mobilise in and out of the high risk areas during heightened
volcanic activity, but also to help them maintain their livelihood ac-
tivities in these fertile areas close to the volcano.
At Red Alert level, when an eruption is about to occur or is in
progress, and there is observable threatening surface activity, the oﬃ-
cial local and provincial-level COE are expected to meet to plan and
coordinate evacuation and support operations, including the activation
of sirens in communities. The police, military and other authorities are
expected to carry out the evacuations (SNGR, 2014). Animals are also
evacuated from the high-risk areas when high levels of volcanic activity
with signiﬁcant ash fall occurs. For example, in 2006, many animals
were evacuated from the slopes of the volcano, preventing people from
having to sell their livestock as they had done in 1999. In practice, and
despite the extensive preparation and protocols for risk management in
the Tungurahua and Chimborazo Provinces, activity levels can and do
change faster than the authorities’ capacity to react. This was the case
in February 2014, when despite the warning sent by the OVT the day
before, assistance to evacuate was only provided when surface activity
was well underway and some residents had already evacuated.
6. System responses to eruptions in 2006 and 2014
This section examines the use of knowledge produced between
communities, scientists and decision-makers in the two crises periods of
2006 and 2014. It highlights a unique role for the shadow network
during emergencies and demonstrates diﬀerences in collective re-
sponses in three diﬀerent locations: those living close to the volcano on
the north-west ﬂanks, those in a high-risk urban area in the town of
Baños and those living in rural locations to the south of the volcano
(Fig. 1).
Fig. 2. Timeline of volcanic activity and risk management system and community responses to the eruption of Tungurahua in August 2006. Information shown includes seismic activity
(indicating potential eruptive activity), observed volcanic explosions (important in shared vocabulary for volcanic activity), evacuations of population, reports of observed ash fall and
pyroclastic ﬂow runout (signiﬁcant threat to life) in diﬀerent places shown in Fig. 1, the nature and direction of communications between diﬀerent elements of the risk management
system, and the intensity of communication between the vigías and the volcano observatory (OVT).These data are synthesised from the online records from the OVT (IG-EPN, 2006c), Hall
et al. (2013), and interviews conducted in 2014 (Armijos and Few, 2015).
M.T. Armijos et al. Global Environmental Change 45 (2017) 217–226
222
6.1. 2006
The eruption of the 14th July 2006 was the ﬁrst time since 1999
that PDC descended the ﬂanks, posing a signiﬁcant threat to life. In
response to these PDC, an attempted evacuation of communities living
at the north and west of the volcano took place. The evacuation was
only partially successful (Ramón, 2009; IG-EPN, 2006b) due to lack of
decision-making by some local authorities, communication problems
and reluctance from the residents to leave their homes. Nonetheless, the
observations of surface volcanic activity served to raise awareness
among the local communities and test the emergency response.
The main eruption in 2006 started on 16 August and prompted a
series of observations, communications and evacuations (see Fig. 2
timeline, with events subdivided by geographical location as shown in
Fig. 1). Following an isolated explosion on 14 August 2006, IG-EPN
issued a special report to the Governor of Tungurahua, the Mayors of
Baños, Pelileo, Penipe, and the civil defence authorities, requesting that
they stay alert to volcanic activity. At 08:06 on 16 August, vigías started
communicating with OVT, with six separate reports of explosions, ‘ca-
ñonazos’, ‘bramidos’ (see Table 1 and Fig. 2) and ash falling on the
north-west ﬂanks of the volcano. These reports were swiftly followed by
oﬃcial communication from OVT to authorities and to the Agoyán
hydroelectric dam, warning them of a new eruption. The municipal
authorities in Pelileo and Penipe recommended an evacuation shortly
afterwards, and by 11:00 the sirens had been activated. The evacuation
of communities on the north-west ﬂanks of the volcano (Juive, Cusúa
and Bilbao) was completed in a few hours, with assistance from gov-
ernment authorities and local vigías (IG-EPN, 2006c; Ramón, 2009).
Later in the evening, a pyroclastic ﬂow destroyed approximately 50
houses in the Juive valley, but no lives were lost. Cooperation between
IG-EPN, the vigía network and authorities through formal and informal
channels had produced an eﬀective evacuation, protecting the lives of
those living on the north-west ﬂanks of the volcano.
Response in the town of Baños was slower however. OVT was un-
able to contact the Mayor of Baños, but was in contact with the COE via
the civil defence radio. COE meetings were in session throughout the
day, but the alert level was not changed to ‘orange’ until 18:00, after
most people had evacuated from the north-west ﬂank of the volcano.
However, people in the Vazcún Valley (a high risk area prone to pyr-
oclastic ﬂows on the north ﬂank of the volcano extending to Baños) did
not start evacuating until 19:00, and in contrast to the timely evacua-
tion from rural villages, the response in Baños was more chaotic, pos-
sibly due to the electricity supply being cut oﬀ and falling of ‘cascajo’
(scoria). As the explosive activity increased, people from other neigh-
bourhoods in Baños began to evacuate voluntarily and by 03:00 on 17
August, approximately 60% of the population had moved into shelters
(IG-EPN, 2006c:9). Evacuations from villages to the south of the vol-
cano (Manzano, Choglontus and Puela) started after the alert level
changed and with the assistance of local vigías. By around 23:00 most
people had left. However, some decided to stay and others returned to
their homes a few hours later and when a large PDC hit the village of
Palictahua, 6 residents were killed. Many animals were lost and
buildings destroyed (Mothes et al., 2015; Valencia, 2010).
Geographical diﬀerences in the timings and eﬀectiveness of eva-
cuations can also be seen in the formal and informal communication
processes. The content and number of the vigía reports on 16 August
reﬂect the variation in response times (Fig. 2). There were more vigías
in the evacuated areas west of the volcano and these vigías sent more
reports to OVT (19 and 18 respectively) than other vigías. In compar-
ison, vigías to the south of the volcano did not report at all during the
paroxysmal phase, some of this biased due to the lack of a repeater to
facilitate radio communication. Vigía communication evolved
throughout the day to acknowledge the greater hazard, with reports
increasingly focused on pyroclastic ﬂows and evacuations rather than
rain (awareness of lahar threat), ashfall or explosions.
The shared vocabulary allowed rapid communication and common
understanding of the intensity of the volcanic activity and its location,
such as ﬂows observed at key conﬂuences in the catchment or passing a
deﬁned location ‘medio cono’ (half way down Tungurahua’s ﬂanks).
Additionally, Radio bulletins broadcast by the Voz del Santuario
(Baños-based radio station) across the entire region were checked by
the COE, making them an oﬃcial source of information for the local
population.
In summary, despite the improvements since the 1999 evacuation,
notably the voluntary evacuation of most residents on the north west
ﬂank of the volcano which saved dozens of lives, in August 2006 some
residents still chose to stay in their homes and people in Palictahua lost
their lives from a large PDC. The diﬀerentiated evacuation process
described above may be due to sirens not having been installed ev-
erywhere in the Penipe Canton, Chimborazo Province where Palictahua
is located, the fact that a PDC had only very recently occurred and was
directed to the north-west of the volcano, and that resettlement sites
had not been built yet, prevented some people from evacuating. The
absence in Palictahua of a vigía with a radio that could communicate
directly with OVT, might have also played a crucial role in the outcome
of the crisis. This highlights the importance of the interaction between
the shadow system and the oﬃcial arrangements elsewhere in the
volcano.
By 2006, the presence of the shadow network had resulted in im-
portant changes in monitoring the volcano and communication im-
provements, including in the establishment of a people-centred early
warning system. This generated increased trust in scientiﬁc information
and permitted the DRM system to, at least partially, respond to the
challenges posed by increased volcanic activity, despite the legacy of
the 1999 crisis.
6.2. 2014
In 2014, the eruption started with low levels of activity on 30
January, prompting a series of observations, communications and
evacuations (see Fig. 3, with events arranged by geographical location
as shown in Fig. 1). Some seismic precursors to Vulcanian eruptions
were recognised by IG-EPN (Hall et al., 2015), and when a signiﬁcant
volcanic tremor was measured on 30 January, OVT alerted the vigía
network to an increased chance of an eruption. The vigías notiﬁed local
residents and some moved their livestock away from areas potentially
threatened by PDC. Vigías reported ash fall around the volcano during
the day and an explosion occurred at 19:05. At the 20:00 call-in, they
reported ash falling and sounds from the volcano. The following day,
visibility was hampered by cloudy conditions, and vigía and OVT re-
ports suggested widespread ashfall around the volcano and a single
explosion, reported as a ‘cañonazo’ by vigías located to the west and
north-west of the volcano at the 20:00 call-in.
During the morning of 1 February, some of the vigías reported
continued ashfall, but there were few observations, possibly due to
cloudy weather. There was a large seismic swarm between 06:30 and
08:30, and at 12:00 OVT contacted authorities in Baños, the vigías, the
mayors of communities located to the north, west and south of the
volcano, the national risk management authorities and the provincial
governors, asking them to be alert in case of a large eruption. At 17:12
and 17:32, two moderately-sized explosions occurred generating ashfall
and a small PDC that travelled a few hundred metres down the north-
west ﬂanks. At 17:39 a larger explosion produced a PDC that reached
much further down the valley bottom, ﬁrst to the north-west, then
south-west, and north of the volcano. People in Cusúa (a village north-
west of the volcano) were trapped in between valleys where PDC had
been conﬁned. After seeing these hazards, many people in the north-
west, west and south of the volcano self-evacuated to safer areas or
their resettlement homes, supported by the local vigías. Most residents
of Baños did not evacuate.
IG-EPN issued a special report on the eruption at 19:14 (IG-EPN,
2014a) and shortly afterwards the regional and local COEs convened
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and the SNGR declared an emergency in the provinces of Tungurahua
and Chimborazo. Sirens were used in areas to the south-west of the
volcano to alert remaining people to evacuate, and the Voz del Santuario
radio station warned people to avoid the valleys and streams at risk
from pyroclastic ﬂows, and to remain calm and wait for oﬃcial in-
structions. During the evening, the COE began managing road access
preventing people from entering aﬀected areas. On the 2nd of February
volcanic activity began to decline and people returned to the area the
following day.
In 2014, the vigías were able to provide immediate reports of ob-
servations of the surface activity, allowing IG-EPN scientists to rapidly
assess the progress of the eruption and PDC activity on 1 February, and
issue a special report to authorities. Shared communication showed
stronger distinctions between diﬀerent types of ashfall (texture as well
as amount) a reﬂection of the importance of diﬀerent sub-components
of the magmatic system, and improving capacity to interpret the size of
explosions in cloudy conditions. The eruption in 2014 showed that
despite developments since 2006 in formal and informal communica-
tions practices and actions to support evacuations, communities were
still vulnerable to rapid-onset volcanic activity. Moreover, because
people want to protect their property and animals they are reluctant to
evacuate before surface activity is very high.
7. Discussion
Risk governance around Tungurahua volcano has undergone an
important transformation since 1999, shaped by a restructuring and
decentralisation of the formal DRM system, improved monitoring but
also the creation of an informal network that has strong similarities to
networks identiﬁed in other settings developed for natural resource
management (Folke et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 2006). This has helped to
facilitate information ﬂows between local actors and promote a more
eﬀective response to changes in volcanic risk. As elsewhere, the
emergence of this shadow network was driven by a social crisis − the
‘disaster’ in 1999, which was caused not by the volcanic eruption, but
by the poor response at diﬀerent levels and possible mis-management of
evacuations.
In Tungurahua, the shadow network has adapted to deal with the
complex socio-ecological problems created by a long-lived volcanic
eruption, allowing people to continue farming and maintaining their
rural livelihoods in relative safety, while at the same time beneﬁtting
from shelter and services in the resettlement sites (Few et al., 2017).
The informal exchanges have taken place outside the formal DRM
system, but interacting with it in a positive and reinforcing way; made
possible by the decentralisation of DRM functions in Ecuador. This has
strengthened the capacity of local authorities and permitted decisions
about volcanic risk management to be taken at a level where the im-
pacts of volcanic hazards on people and livelihoods can be better un-
derstood. The network not only exists in the ‘shadows’ of the formal
system but has strengthened links between diﬀerent stakeholders:
principally, between those communities living in high risk areas close
to the volcano, the scientists involved in monitoring the volcano, local
risk managers and other government oﬃcials and emergency services.
The interactions between communities, scientists and local autho-
rities, have occurred both during periods of quiescence and during
heightened activity. They have fostered adaptations in the scientiﬁc
understanding of longer-term evolution of volcanic activity and the
advisory response, and in the speed and eﬀectiveness of communication
and enhanced evacuation processes. In 1999 when the eruption began,
there had been no volcanic activity for about 80 years, and IG-EPN
interpretations of what the volcano was doing were reactive and solely
based on changes in geophysical monitoring measurements and ob-
servations. There were high levels of uncertainty in anticipating de-
velopments in activity. Neither was there a pan-volcano radio system in
operation at that time. By 2014, there had been signiﬁcant ‘scientiﬁc
adaptations’, including an improved capability to monitor and to in-
terpret the volcano’s behaviour. This resulted in an improved ability to
anticipate changes from quiescence to eruption onset, and has led to the
Fig. 3. Timeline of volcanic activity and risk management system and community responses to the eruption of Tungurahua in February 2014. Information shown includes seismic activity
(indicating potential eruptive activity), observed volcanic explosions (important in shared vocabulary for volcanic activity), evacuations of population, reports of observed ash fall and
pyroclastic ﬂow runout (signiﬁcant threat to life) in diﬀerent locations shown in Fig. 1, the nature and direction of communications between diﬀerent elements of the risk management
system, and the intensity of communication between the vigías and the volcano observatory (OVT). Data sources as Fig. 2.
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use of clear protocols for advice and communication that are linked
directly to local risk managers and authorities.
A key element of the shadow network has been its role in generating
observations of the volcano in near-real-time, communicated through
vocabulary that is understood by scientists and community members. A
new shared consensual understanding of thresholds for preparedness
action has been generated. Levels of uncertainty in anticipating changes
in volcanic activity have reduced considerably since 1999, but the
ability to respond to very rapid changes during eruptions still remains a
challenge. This will continue to demand rigorous observation, re-
cognition and communication when geophysical changes are rapidly
displayed before the onset of Vulcanian explosions.
The ‘communication adaptations’ have occurred through the de-
velopment of a shared understanding and vocabulary to refer to vol-
canic hazards, whereby communities, via the vigías, have been able to
access and interpret hazards data in conjunction with the scientists.
Knowledge about the volcanic hazards - what is happening and what is
likely to happen - is generated by combining scientiﬁc information with
the vigías’ own observations of the volcano and their years of experience
of living through the process. Improved information exchange between
these stakeholders has also avoided the common problem of conﬂicting
messages from scientists and authorities, and has improved trust in
oﬃcial messages.
Linked to improvements in communication are the ‘adaptations in
evacuations’ whereby decisions on when to evacuate are taken locally,
voluntarily and - in almost all cases - collectively. In 1999, local com-
munities had no prior experience of the volcano being active, or of
preparing for an evacuation. The forced evacuation was disruptive and
chaotic, generating high levels of mistrust in the scientists and gov-
ernment authorities, but today self-evacuations occur. This has been
made possible through the development of shared notions of tolerable
risk (Few et al., 2017). The decision to initiate or intensify evacuation
activities in 2006 was strongly associated with surface activity (for
example, PDC’s) passing a deﬁned location (medio cono) or with in-
itiation or intensiﬁcation of ground movement associated with in-
creased explosive energy. These thresholds vary for each geographical
and social setting, and they are diﬀerent for each community (Figs. 2
and 3) (Few et al., 2017). Yet the decision to evacuate is now grounded
in these observations and in the knowledge of the community members
and improved shelter options - either in the resettlement sites or better-
equipped temporary shelters. The rapid onset activity in 2014 proved
more challenging, however, with a reduced time interval between the
onset of observable activity and the crossing of these tolerable risk
thresholds. Nonetheless, the fact that people are willing to evacuate
without mandatory evacuation orders means they are better prepared
than before. The evacuations are generally well managed and include
transport and shelter for animals, which is vital for farmers to be able to
return to their activities when volcanic activity declines.
The shadow network has facilitated interactions that take place
outside the formal DRM system but, most importantly, also interact
with it. The combination of informal and formal observations and in-
terpretations of volcanic behaviour, of communications between local
stakeholders and in decision-making processes about when to evacuate,
have collectively produced a better outcome than if the same groups
had undertaken similar, yet independent actions. The shadow network
around Tungurahua volcano has played a key role in improving col-
lective responses to volcanic risk, allowing people to maintain their
livelihoods during heightened volcanic activity and minimising the
need for forced evacuations, which are highly disruptive. This network
has therefore facilitated adaptations in DRM in response to changes in
volcanic behaviour; but a step change may now be required to antici-
pate and respond better to rapid-onset volcanic activity. Finally, the
sustainability of this ‘shadow’ network will depend on how volcanic
activity, livelihood activities and governance structures evolve and
change over the longer term.
Data
For access to data used to construct ﬁg. 2 and 3 please contact the
corresponding author.
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